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STATUTORY INCORPORATION FLEXIBILITY IN MARY-
LAND: DRAFTING CORPORATE DOCUMENTS
FOR THE PRIVATELY-HELD ENTERPRISE
Ronald M. Shapirot
The provisions of the Maryland Code governing the incor-
poration process enable the attorney incorporating a pri-
vately-held enterprise to draft corporate documents ac-
commodating the needs of the particular promoting indi-
viduals. This article focuses on the drafting of articles of
incorporation and bylaws, and places particular emphasis
on the options for allocating control and financial interests
available within the Maryland statutory framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
The provisions governing corporations in general' contained
in the Corporations and Associations Article of the Maryland
Annotated Code offer a wide variety of options for planning the
incorporation of a business entity.2 In order to acquaint clients
interested in forming a corporation with the range of options
available to them under the Code, and to guide and implement
their decisions intelligently, it is essential that counsel have a
thorough understanding of the statutory provisions that govern
the incorporating process. Central to corporate planning are de-
cisions concerning the allocation of control and of financial interests
in the enterprise. The two primary corporate organizational doc-
uments - the articles of incorporation and the bylaws - sub-
stantially embody these decisions, and thus together function as
t B.A., Haverford College, 1964; J.D., Harvard University, 1967; Partner, Shapiro
& Sachs, P.A.; Lecturer, University of Baltimore and University of Maryland
Schools of Law.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Elizabeth G. New-
comb, Articles Editor, University of Baltimore Law Review.
1. MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., §§ 1-101 to 3-520 (1975), as amended,(Supp. 1976) [hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "Code"].
2. This article is limited to those provisions applicable to a privately-held corpora-
tion organized under the general corporations provisions of the Code. It will
cover those situations where the group of individuals who intend to organize a
corporation are few in number (three or four) and wish each member to obtain
equal stock interest and a position on the board of directors. The focus is so
limited because the overwhelming number of incorporation problems faced by
the general practitioner arise out of such privately-held organizations. For those
who have used the MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art, Title Four (1975),
Close Corporation form for such groups, see Shapiro, The Statutory Close Cor-
poration: A Critique and a Corporate Planning Alternative, 36 MD. L. REv.
- (1977).
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a vitally important agreement delineating the rights and obliga-
tions of the stockholders and directors of the corporation. Too
often, however, the "drafting" of these documents is accomplished
through mechanical repetition of provisions contained in a "form
set." The benefits of tailoring documents to the characteristics
and objectives of a particular promoter group is sacrificed for the
convenience of adopting what has been used before.
There is a wide variety of choices available for the allocation
of control and the delineation of financial interests. The "control"
spectrum ranges from tilting the scales of corporate control heavily
in favor of an incumbent board of directors to according minority
stockholders far-reaching veto rights. Financial interests can be
apportioned equally by conferring dividend and liquidation rights
to all stockholders on the same basis, or the apportionment can
favor one individual or stockholder group by the allocation of such
rights on a preferred basis to that individual or group of stock-
holders. 3 In order to advise clients competently as to what arrange-
ments would best accomplish their objectives, and to fulfill the at-
torney's responsibility in planning and drafting articles of incor-
poration and bylaws for a privately-held corporation,4 the general
practitioner must be thoroughly familiar with the Code options.
The purposes of this article are (1) to acquaint the non-
corporate specialist with the statutory provisions governing in-
corporation and (2) to demonstrate the benefits of "tailor-made"
corporations over "form corporations." Sample articles of incor-
poration and bylaw provisions will be included to demonstrate
practical corporate planning points.5
3. At the initial stages of pre-incorporation planning, counsel should consider the
potential for conflicts of interest and the advisability of having varying interests
in a prospective enterprise represented by different counsel during the process
of drafting organizational documents.
4. For the purposes of this article, the author has adopted Professor F. Hodge
O'Neal's recent definition of a "close" or "privately-held" corporation:
The term 'close corporation' has been defined in various ways. It is often
used to distinguish and set apart the corporation with only a few share-
holders from the 'public issue' or publicly-held corporation. Another
popular definition states that a close corporation is a corporation whose
shares are not generally traded in the securities market. One of the fewjudicial definitions says that the term means 'a corporation in which the
stock is held in few hands, or in few families, and wherein it is not at all,
or only rarely, dealt in by buying or selling.'
F. HODGE O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 1.01, at 2 n.1
(1975).
5. Certain forms set forth in this article are adapted from R. SHAPIRO & A.R.
SACHS, MARYLAND CORPORATE FORMS - PaRAcTcE (1976).
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II. ARTICLES OF INCOPORATION: MANDATORY
PROVISIONS
The filing of articles of incorporation6 with the State Depart-
ment of Assessments and Taxation7 and acceptance of the articles
by the Department are prerequisites to the formation of a de jure
corporation in Maryland." Corporate existence commences when
the Department accepts the articles for record. 9 Filing improperly
drawn articles can cause unnecessary delay in achieving corporate
status,10 and more importantly, raises the spectre of defective
incorporation, which can result in the loss of the limited liability
generally achieved through corporate status.1 The danger of de-
fective incorporation can easily be avoided by careful attention to
those matters required by the Code to be included in articles of
incorporation. 12 Thus, although more planning time will be spent
6. The articles of incorporation are hereinafter sometimes referred to as the
"charter" or "articles." The term "charter" as used in the Code not only in-
cludes the articles of incorporation, but also, inter alia, amended articles of
incorporation, articles of amendment, and articles of restatement. MD. ANN.
CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art, § 1-101 (e) (Supp. 1976).
7. The Maryland State Department of Assessments and Taxation is hereinafter
sometimes referred to as the "Department."
8. MD. ANN. COD, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-102 (a) (2) (filing) and § 2-102(b) (1)
(acceptance) (1975).
9. Id. § 2-102(b) (1).
10. If the articles do not satisfy applicable requirements, then a Department official
will return the articles to the incorporator for revision.
11. Loss of limited liability may be avoided by successful assertion of either the doc-
trine of incorporation by estoppel or de facto corporation. While it is clear that
the more limited doctrine of incorporation by estoppel is recognized in Maryland,
see Cranson v. International Business Machs. Corp., 234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d 33
(1964), there is some doubt as to the viability in this State of the doctrine of de
facto corporation. See id., and Note, Liability Under Defectively Organized
Corporations, 26 MD. L. Ry. 354 (1966).
12. The mandatory charter provisions are enumerated in MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. &
Ass'ns Art., § 2-104(a) (1975), and are as follows:(1) The name and address of each incorporator and a statement that each
incorporator is: (i) 18 years or older; and (ii) Forming a corpora-
tion under the general laws of the State of Maryland;
(2) The name of the corporation;
(3) The purposes for which the corporation is formed;
(4) The address of the principal office of the corporation;
(5) The name and address of the resident agent of the corporation;
(6) (i) The total number of shares of stock of all classes which the cor-
poration has authority to issue; (ii) The number of shares of stock
of each class; (iii) The par value of the shares of stock of each class
or a statement that the shares are without par value; and (iv) If there
are any shares of stock with par value, the aggregate par value of all
the shares of all classes;
(7) If the stock is divided into classes as permitted by § 2-105 of this sub-
title, a description of each class including any preferences, conversion
1976]
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evaluating the effects of and choosing optional charter provisions, 3
the mandatory provisions should not receive summary treatment.
The provisions required by the Code to be included in the
articles, and the major considerations attendant to the drafting of
such provisions, are as follows:
(1) The name and address of the incorporator and a state-
ment that he or she is over 18 and incorporating under Maryland
law.14 The incorporator should be distinguished from the common
law promoter. The promoter is the instigating force behind the
organization of the corporation,15 while the incorporator's statu-
tory function is only to provide the Department with a name and
a set of articles for filing. For that scintilla of time after filing
but before an organizational board meeting is held, the incorporator
has the power to revise the articles by preparing and filing amended
articles of incorporation.'8 Generally, for convenience, counsel
drafting the articles is designated to hold this position.
(2) Corporate name.17 In addition to indicating corporate
status by traditional symbols,' the corporate name must not be
preempted by or misleadingly similar to that of another corporation
registered or qualified to do business in Maryland, and must not
indicate a corporate purpose other than that stated in the charter.1 9
and other rights, voting powers, restrictions, limitations as to divi-
dends, qualifications, and terms and conditions of redemption; and
(8) The number of directors and the names of those who will serve as
directors until the first annual meeting and until their successors are
elected and qualify.
13. Id. § 2-104(b) and § 2-105.
14. Id. § 2-104(a) (1).
15. The Maryland Court of Appeals has said in defining a promoter:
[I]n a comprehensive sense 'promoter' includes those who undertake to
form a corporation and to procure to it the rights, instrumentalities and
capital by which it is to carry out the purposes set forth in its charter, and
to establish it as fully able to do its business.
Crosse v. Callis, 263 Md. 65, 72, 282 A.2d 86, 89 (1971), citing Old Dominion
Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow,' 203 Mass. 159, 177, 89 N.E. 193,
201 (1909).
16. Amended articles of incorporation may be filed by the incorporator(s) prior to
the organizational meeting of the board of directors, provided there is no stock
outstanding or subscribed for. MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-603 (a)
and (b) (1975). If stock is outstanding or subscribed for, the proposed amend-
ment must be initiated by adoption of a resolution by the board of directors, and
must be submitted to the stockholders for their approval. Id. § 2-604. The
document filed with the Department to evidence the latter, more formal procedure
is referred to as "articles of amendment." Id. § 2-607 (Supp. 1976).
17. Id. § 2-104(a) (2).
18. Corporate status may be indicated by inclusion in the name of the words "cor-
poration," "incorporated," "limited" or abbreviation of one of these words, or in-
clusion of the word "company," if not immediately preceded by "and" or a symbol
therefor. MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-106(a) (Supp. 1976).
19. Id. § 2-106(b). There is, however, no statutory prohibition against the use of a
name that is misleadingly similar to that of an unincorporated enterprise.
Drafting Corporate Documents
In order to prevent preemption during the period of corporate
organization, the Code permits the reservation of a specific qualify-
ing name for a period of thirty days by forwarding to the Depart-
ment a signed application and a nominal fee.20
(3) Statement of corporate purposes.2 1 Since broad general
powers are automatically accorded Maryland corporations by the
Code,22 it is unnecessary to reiterate these powers in the articles.
Nevertheless, a general description should be included, setting forth
the type of business in which it is expected the corporation will
engage.28 In order to authorize expansion of operations to fields
of endeavor beyond those initially contemplated, one of the stated
corporate purposes might also provide that the corporation may
"engage in any other lawful business."
There may be times, however, when counsel must pre-
pare provisions that narrow the statutory powers in order to
comply with special Code or non-corporate law requirements. For
example, a non-profit corporation seeking tax-exempt status must
be restricted to very limited purposes and powers to satisfy. In-
ternal Revenue Code requirements respecting such a corporation.
2 4
(4) Address of principal offlce of the corporation.2
(5) Name and address of resident agent.26 In contrast to
the incorporator, the resident agent must be a Maryland corpora-
tion or a Maryland citizen residing in the State.2 T Some counsel
recommend themselves as resident agent. Others, however, prefer
to name a stockholder of the corporation because of the possibility
that the corporate client may later engage counsel other than the
attorney organizing the corporation.
(6) The total number of shares of authorized stock and a
statement of its par value (and the aggregate value thereof) or
that the stock has no par value,28 and
20. Id. § 2-107(b).
21. Id. §2-104(a) (3).
22. MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-103 (1975), as amended, (Supp. 1976).
23. Id. § 2-104(a) (3).
24. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501 (c) and regulations thereunder. Other corpora-
tions which require adherence to special statutory provisions respecting the
statement of purpose or similar matters include: non-stock corporations, MD.
ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 5-201 to 5-208 (1975), as amended, (Supp.
1976), professional service corporations, id. § 5-101 to 5-122 (1975), as amended,
(Supp. 1976), and statutory close corporations, id., Title 4 (1975), as amended,
(Supp. 1976).
25. MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-104 (a) (4) (1975).
26. Id. § 2-104(a) (5).
27. Id. § 2-108 (a) (2).
28. Id. § 2-104(a) (6) (iii).
1976]
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(7) If there are classes of stock, a description of each
class.29 Many of the vitally important aspects of stock authoriza-
tion are governed by optional provisions relating to the allocation
of control and financial interests and are considered below.30
Nevertheless, because the par value or a statement that authorized
stock is without par value must be set forth in the articles, an
initial choice must be made between authorization of par and no
par stock. The choice of no par stock accords the board of directors
maximum flexibility in making an allocation between stated capital
and capital surplus,31 and thus permits a build-up of capital sur-
plus. Capital surplus, in turn, contributes to the total surplus of
the corporation, which provides the funds necessary to implement
certain corporate transactions such as the declaration of divi-
dends3 2 and repurchase of stock.3 3 In the case of a privately-held
corporation, authorization of 5,000 shares of common stock with-
out par value, the maximum number of shares of no par stock
for the minimum bonus tax, should provide adequate authorized
stock for issuance to its several stockholders.3 4
(8) Number and names of initial directors.5 The persons
named as the initial directors of the corporation are vested with
the authority to direct the management of the corporation until
the first annual meeting or such other time as their successors are
duly chosen and qualify.3 6 While, at this writing, at least three
directors must be named for a general corporation, statutory reform
has been sought to permit a minimum of one director in Maryland
general corporations."
29. Id. § 2-104(a) (7).
30. See text accompanying notes 44-54 infra.
31. If stock is issued with par value, only that consideration received in excess
of the aggregate par value constitutes capital surplus, while any portion of the
consideration received from stock without par value may be allocated to capital
surplus by the board prior to the issuance of such stock. MD. ANN. CODE, Corp.
& Ass'ns Art., § 2-303(a) and (b) (1975).
32. Id. § 2-309(b) and (c).
33. Id. §2-311(d).
34. The choice of no par stock may result in a slightly higher bonus tax than stock
of low par value, because for bonus tax purposes no par stock is deemed to have
a value of $20 per share. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 194(b) (1975). This dis-
advantage is minimal, however, as the bonus tax is relatively nominal in either
case. (For example, the present bonus tax on 10,000 shares authorized with $1
par value is $20, and the bonus tax on the same number of shares with no par
value is $40. Id. § 194(a).)
35. MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-104(a) (8) (1975).
36. Id. § 2-404 (a). In a privately-held corporation, it is generally desirable to name
the same number of directors as there are stockholders.
37. The author considers such statutory reform a salutory alternative to the prob-
lems inherent in statutory (Title Four) close corporations and a device for
eliminating "dummy" or "straw" directors. See Shapiro, The Statutory Close




An example of provisions setting forth only mandatory
charter matters follows:
FIRST: I, whose post office
address is ............. .. ....... ,., being
at least eighteen (18) years of age, do hereby form a cor-
poration under and by virtue of the General Laws of the
State of Maryland.
SECOND: The name of the corporation (which is here-
inafter called the "Corporation") is ABC, INC.
THIRD: The purposes for which the Corporation is
formed are:
(1) [Include a general summary purpose of business
to be pursued]; and to engage in any other lawful
purpose and/or business.
(2) To do anything permitted by Section 2-103 of the
Corporations and Associations Article of the Anno-
tated Code of Maryland, as amended from time to
time.
FOURTH: The post office address of the principal office
of the corporation in the State is .,
Maryland. The name and post office address of the Resi-
dent Agent of the Corporation in this State are .,
Maryland. Said Resident Agent is a [Maryland citizen
actually residing in this State.] [Maryland corporation.]
FIFTH: The total number of shares of capital stock
which the Corporation has authority to issue is -_ (-)
shares of common stock without par value. [If shares with
par value, the aggregate of the par value of all authorized
shares must be stated.]
SIXTH: The number of directors of the Corporation
shall be ( .... ), which number may be increased
or decreased pursuant to the bylaws of the Corporation,
but shall never be less than three (3). The names of the
directors who shall act until the first annual meeting or
until their successors are duly chosen and qualified are:
III. ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION: PERMISSIBLE
PROVISIONS
Coverage of the mandatory charter matters set forth above is
sufficient to satisfy prerequisites to acceptance of the articles for
recording by the Department.88 Nevertheless, to plan a privately-
38. See text accompanying notes 6-11 supra.
1976]
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hel.d corporation i.nvolviing two to fouir stockholders that is flexible
enough to account for unexpected future occurrences, Yet structured
enough to preserve the initial stockholders' basic intentions, the
optional charter provisions of the Code must be effectively utilized.
Tremendous flexibility is available since the articles may contain
virtually any lawful provisioh deeined desirable. In two successive
provisions of the Code, 9 the corporate planner 'is conveniently
39. The perrissible charter "pio'Visidns are enumerated im MD. AiN. CODE, Corp. &
Ass'ns Art., § 2-104(b) and '§ 2-105 (1975), which state:
§ 2-104(b) Permissible provisions. - The articles of incorporation may
include!:
(1) Any provision not inconsistent with law which defines, limits, or
regulates the powers of the corporation, its directors and stock-
holders, any class of its stockholders, or the holders of any bonds,
nbtes, or other securities which it may issue;
(2) Any restriction not inconsistent with law on the transferability of
stock of any class;
(3) Any provision authorized by this article to be included in the bylaws;
(4) Any, provision which requires for any purpbse the concurrence of a
greater iroportion of the votes 'of all classes or of any class of stock
than the proportion required by this article 'for that purpose;
(5) A provision which requires for any purpose a lesser proportion of
the votes of all classes or of any class of stock than the proportion
required by this article for that purpose, but this proportion may not
be less than a majority of all the votes entitled to be cast on the
matter;
(6) A provision which divides its directors into classes and specifies the
term of office of erch class; and
(7) 'A provisioh for minority representation through cuhulative voting
in the eledtion Of directors and the terms on which cumulative
voting rights may be exercised.
§ 2-105. 'Charter provisions relating to capital stock. A corporation may
provide by its charter:
(1) For one or more classes of stock, the voting rights of each class,
and any restriction on or denial of these rights;
(2) As to each class of stock, either the par value of the shares or that
the shares are without par value;
(3) (i) That the corporation shall set apart dividends for or pay divi-
dends to the holders of a specified class of stock before any divi-
dends are set apart for or paid to the holders of another class of
stock; (ii) The rate, amount, and time of payment of the dividends;
:and. (iii) Whether the dividends are cumulative, cumulative to a
limited extent, or noncumulative;
(4) That a4'y specifid'class'of 'stock is preferred over another class as to
its distributive share of 'the assets on voluhtary -or involuntary
liquidation of the corporation and the amount of the preference;
(5) That any specified class of stock may be redeemed at the option of
the corporation or of the holders of the stock and the terms and
conditions of redemption, including'the time and price of iedemption;
(6) That any specified class of stock is convertible into shares of stock of
one or more other classes and the terms and conditions of conversion;
(7) That the holders of any specified securities issued or to be issued
by the corporation have any voting rights or other rights which, by
law, are or may be conferred'on stockholders;
(8) For any other preferences, rights, restrictions, 'including 'restric-
tions on transferability, and qualifications not inconsistent with law;
(9) That the board of directors may classify or reclassify any unissued
stock from time to time by setting or changing the preferences,
Drafting Corporate Documents
provided with a list of available options which should be considered
carefully with any group 'of individuals contemplating incorpora-
tion, in much the same manner as potential provisions in a partner-
ship agreement are reviewed with prospective partners.40 In pre-
paring the corporate charter, counsel should -explain to clients the
ramifications of each permissible provision. The drafting -of op-
tional charter provisions centers around two major considerations:
allocation of control :and delineation of inancial interests in the
corporation.
A. Allocation of Control
The primary ;means for allocating -control is through optional
charter -provisions governing 'the manner In which 7-members of
the board 'of directors are to be elected. If no such provisions are
included, board of director elections will be determined -by the
statutory principle of majority xule.4 1 This principle, if unqualified,
allows .a 9tockholder or .stockholders owning -a bare majority of
the issued -and outstanding voting stock of the corporation -to elect
the entire board 'of directors 42 If, on the other hand, a group of
stockholders agrees that, without regard to majority stock owner-
ship, each stockholder should -have representation on the board,
or that a minority stockholder should have at least one representa-
tive on the board, counsel can achieve either of these objectives
through inclusion of provisions in the 'charter -eliminating ma-
jority rule, or tying it to some limiting device such as a voting
trust agreement 43
The most direct method for allocating board representation
among vaTious stockholders is -to designate 'classes of stock in the
charter" and 'to proVide that the ho1ders -of each class of stock
-conversion ,or -other rights, voting :powers, restrictions, limitations
as -to -dividends, ,qualifications, -or ,terms or -conditions -of redemption
of the stodk;(10) 'For any defirijiion, limitation, or denial -of -the preemptive rights of
stockh6lders 'to -acquire' additional ,stock tin ,the -corporation.
40. See' note 3 sdpra.
41. MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns.Art, § 2-506(a)i(2),(1975).
42. This result assumes that all the shares entitled to vote are cast for the election
of -directors. (Otherwise, 'even fewer 5stockholders 'could -elect the entire board, as
the -Code provides:
A majority of-all the votes cast at a -meeting at which -a quorum is ,present
,is sufficient to approve any matter which properly comes before .the meeting.
Id.'§'2-506 (a)'(2).
43. 'For a discussion :and -examiles 'of -voting trust agreements, -see -SHAPIRO &
Sachs, :supra note .5, 1 ch. 5, form 5.3.4; -Woloszyn, -A Practical -Guide to Voting
Trusts, 4 U. BALT. L. RE-v. 245 (1975).
44. See MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art, § 2-105(1) (1975), which authorizes
use of'classes of stock. 'It -should be noted that the use of classes of stock as a
control 'device may preclude certain'tax options, 'such as the -election to be a
'Subchapter S corporation under the Internal 'Revenue Code, INT. REv. 'CoDE OF
1954, § 1371, unless the classes are carefully structured so that their right to
1976]
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will be entitled to elect a designated class of directors.45 For ex-
ample, the charter of a corporation comprised of three stockholders
desiring an equal voice on the board of directors without regard
to their relative percentages of stock ownership could provide:
The total number of shares of capital stock that the Cor-
poration has authority to issue is five thousand (5,000) di-
vided into two thousand, five hundred (2,500) shares of
Class A Common Stock without par value, two thousand
(2,000) shares of Class B Common Stock without par value,
and five hundred (500) shares of Class C Common Stock
without par value.
The following is a description of each class of stock of
the Corporation with the preferences, conversion and other
rights, restrictions, voting powers, and qualifications of
each class:
1. Except as hereinafter provided with respect to the
election of the Board of Directors of the Corporation, the
Class A Common Stock, the Class B Common Stock, and
the Class C Common Stock of the Corporation shall be
identical in all respects and for all purposes, and the holders
of Class A Common Stock, the holders of Class B Common
Stock and the holders of Class C Common Stock, voting
together and without distinction as to class, shall be en-
titled to one (1) vote in all proceedings in which actions
shall be taken by the stockholders of the Corporation.
2. With respect to the election of the Board of Directors
of the Corporation:
(1) the holders of Class A Common Stock (a) shall
nominate and elect one (1) director who shall be known
as the Class A Director, and (b) in the event of the death,
disability, removal, resignation or refusal to act of the
Class A Director, the holders of Class A Common Stock,
to the exclusion of the holders of all other classes of stock
of the Corporation, shall nominate and elect one (1) di-
rector to fill the vacancy so created by such death, disability,
removal, resignation or refusal to act; and
(2) the holders of Class B Common Stock (a) shall
nominate and elect one (1) director who shall be known as
the Class B Director, and (b) in the event of the death,
disability, removal, resignation, or refusal to act of the
Class B Director, the holders of the Class B Common Stock,
to the exclusion of the holders of all other classes of stock
elect members of the board of directors is proportionate to the number of shares
in each class. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1968) and cases decided thereunder.
45. See MD. ANN. CoDE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-104(b)(6) (1975), which au-
thorizes use of classes of directors.
[Vol. 6
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of the Corporation, shall nominate and elect one (1) direc-
tor to fill the vacancy so created by such death, disability,
removal, resignation or refusal to act; and
(3) the holders of Class C Common Stock (a) shall
nominate and elect one (1) director who shall be known as
the Class C Director, and (b) in the event of the death,
disability, removal, resignation, or refusal to act of the
Class C Director, the holders of the Class C Common Stock,
to the exclusion of the holders of all other classes of stock
of the Corporation, shall nominate and elect one (1) di-
rector to fill the vacancy so created by such death, dis-
ability, removal, resignation or refusal to act.
The number of directors of the Corporation shall be
three (3). The names of the directors who shall act until
the first annual meeting of the stockholders of the Corpora-
tion or until their successors are duly chosen and qualified
and the class of Common Stock which they represent are:
Class A Director: Class B Director: Class C Director:
Such a provision, coupled with issuance of one class of stock re-
spectively to each of the three stockholders, assures all of the
stockholders the representation on the board of directors to which
they have agreed. The model "classes of stock - classes of di-
rectors" provision can be tailored to the needs and numbers of
an individual stockholder group in a given corporation. 46
Although classification of stock and directors will implement
the desired balance of power, additional provisions are necessary
to ensure its maintenance.
Since the purpose of this classification provision is to allocate
control among all stockholders without regard to majority stock
ownership, it should be protected from possible extinction by an
amendment which could be passed by a vote of less than all the
stockholders. To avert this danger, counsel should insert a provision
prohibiting amendment of the classification provision without
unanimous approval by vote of all shares entitled to be cast
thereon.47
46. The number of directors to be elected by the holders of the various classes of
stock may be varied to satisfy any specified situation. For example, a minority
class of stock may be assured of electing one director, or a fifty per cent stock-
holder may be given the right to elect two-thirds of the directors in accordance
with his importance in managing the enterprise. In such cases, the classes of
common stock are generally identical in all respects except with respect to
board of directors election.
47. Although the Code provides that stockholders shall approve any charter amend-
ments by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of all the votes entitled to be cast on
the matter, MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art, § 2-604(d) (1975), the Code
also allows this two-thirds requirement to be varied down to a bare majority
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Dilution of an individual stockholder's control of a class of
directors can also be avoided by limiting the future issuance of
stock. This can be accomplished by a charter provision requiring
unanimous approval of either the board of directors 48 or the stock-
holders 49 for stock issuance.
The above discussion illustrates the importance of including in
the charter not only provisions designed to effect the immediate
result desired, but also provisions which shelter that result from
future unintended erosion.
An alternative device for accomplishing minority stockholder
board representation is cumulative voting.50 The usefulness of the
cumulative voting device, however, is diminished because it re-
quires the use of a mathematical formula which may be annoying
to stockholders,5' and because it does not permit the precision of
allocation among three or more groups that can be achieved
through the use of classes of stock. These shortcomings are due to
the fact that cumulative voting was conceived to assure minority
representation rather than to divide representation among diver-
gent interests within the corporation. 2
A third means of allocating the power to elect members of the
board of directors is through use of non-voting stock.53 A class
of voting stock can be issued to those stockholders who will ac-
tively manage the business, and a class of non-voting stock to other
stockholders. The usefulness of this device may be limited prac-
tically to situations where there are two groups of interests who
agree that one is to be accorded control.
of all votes entitled to be cast, and up to unanimity. Id. § 2-104(b) (4) and (5).
Further, if classes of stock are selected as a control device, the Code appears to
build in protection for each class by its reference to the required vote of "all
classes or of any class;" since the Code is not clear as to whether the require-
ment is two-thirds of each class or two-thirds of all the stock outstanding and
entitled to vote, drafting unanimous vote requirements further protects the desired
balance of corporate control.
48. Id. § 2-204(b) (1) and (2), in conjunction with § 2-104(b) (4).
49. Id. § 2-204(b)(3), in conjunction with § 2-104(b)(4). .Utilizing preemptive
rights as an alternative to the provisions referred to in the text at this and the
preceding footnote is unsatisfactory in view of the substantial statutory qualifica-
tions on preemptive rights. See id. § 2-205.
50. Id. § 2-104(b) (7).
51. Professor Henn sets forth the following formula for determining cumulative
voting:
X = Number of votes needed to
Y x N elect each director
X = + I Y ='Total number of shares voting
N + I at meeting
N = Number of directors to be elected
See H. HENN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 321(1974).
52. See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 189, at 365 (1970).
53. The use of non-voting stock is indirectly authorized by MD. ANN. CODE, Corp.
& Ass'ns Art., § 2-105(1) (1975).
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The above alternatives demonstrate various methods available
for electing the board of directors. The choice of the most suitable
device marks the first step in allocating control in the privately-
held corporation; the second step is delineating the board's power
to direct management of the corporation.54
In drafting these limitations and qualifications on the board's
power, counsel should focus on two areas of board action: those
matters on which board action is required by the Code, and those
matters not governed by particular Code provisions but which fall
within the general authority of the board to direct corporate
management.
The most prominent matters upon which board action is statu-
torily required are stock issuance, 5 the declaration of dividends,55
the election and removal of corporate officers,5 7 and the initiation
of extraordinary corporate matters, including charter amendments,
which ultimately require stockholder approval.58
Absent a charter or Code provision to the contrary, the "action
of a majority of the directors present at a meeting at which a
quorum is present is the action of the board of directors." 59 The
statute thus allows adjustment of the board's management power
through variation of the majority rule principle or the proportion
of members required to constitute a quorum, or both. While failure
to adjust either the required vote or the quorum percentage may
produce results which are neither desirable nor anticipated, 0 ad-
justment of the voting requirement alone may be equally insuffi-
cient to effectuate the desired balance of board power.61 Counsel
must consider the combined effect of voting and quorum require-
ments.
Generally, the board vote required to act on a particular matter
should increase with the importance of that matter to the organiz-
54. Id. § 2-104(b) (1).
55. Id. § 2-203(a)(1). For a discussion of unanimity and stock issuance require-
ments, see text accompanying notes 30 & 40 supra.
56. MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-309(a) (1975).
57. Id. § 2- 4 13(a) (election) and (c) (removal). The right of the board of direc-
tors to elect officers is subject to variation by charter or bylaws provision. Id.
§ 2-413(a).
58. Id. § 3-105(b) (consolidation, merger, or transfer of assets), id. § 3-403(b)
(voluntary dissolution), and id. § 2-604(b) (charter amendment).
59. Id. § 2-408(a).
60. Failure to modify the statutory language could give even less than a majority of
board members the power to take board action. For example, if the board consists
of eight members,a quorum is five. Id. § 2-408(b) (1). A mere majority of the
quorum (three persons) can act for the entire board. Id. § 2-408(a).
61. If the vote required for board action is raised to unanimous action of a duly
constituted meeting but the quorum is not changed from a majority of the board,
id.. § 2-408(b) (1), a mere majority of board members can still act for the en-
tire board.
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ing stockholders. For example, there is the possibility that a con-
flict will arise between individual stockholder desires for dividends
and management's view that the corporation should retain earn-
ings. Stockholders alerted to this possible conflict may, in the
initial planning stages, decide that the corporation's need to
use the earnings for continued corporate growth is to prevail
over individual desires. In this case, the declaration of dividends
should be subjected to a higher or even unanimous director vote
requirement.62
A similar analysis must be made in connection with each area
in which the Code requires board action.63 Once prospective stock-
holders understand the implications behind the decisions, they can
decide which of their individual needs in each area should, in the
corporate interest, be subject to board control. Counsel then can
readily draft a combination of appropriate charter and bylaw
provisions to implement these decisions.
As a further illustration, the stockholders in a privately-held
enterprise are often also its officer-employees. Because the board
of directors is statutorily charged with the election and removal of
corporate officers, 64 charter provisions should be included that
protect stockholder-officers' job security by qualifying the board's
power over employment matters. Three stockholders equally in-
volved in organizing a new corporation might feel adequately pro-
tected after executing long-term employment contracts. 5 Never-
theless, the position of each as a corporate officer might be jeop-
ardized by the failure to include unanimous quorum and voting
requirements for removal of officers. If an unforeseen conflict
between the board and a stockholder-officer should later develop,
he or she could be removed by a simple majority vote of directors
at a meeting at which a quorum is present.66 A charter or bylaw
62. For example, it may be recognized upon incorporation that the corporation has
substantial projected capital needs to insure its growth. In order to sustain such
needs, stockholders may agree that dividends ought to be severely curtailed even if
such curtailment might deleteriously affect their personal financial circumstances
at a later date.
63. See text accompanying notes 55-58 supra, for reference to other matters with
respect to which such voting standards are altered.
64. MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-413(a) (1975).
65. Long-term employment contracts can be authorized by permitted variation of the
statutory one year term for corporate officers. Id. § 2-413(b). This statutory
provision should be compared with challenges historically leveled at long-term
employment contracts on the theory that they "bind the hands of future boards
of directors." 2 W. FLETCHER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS § 336 (rev. ed. 1964).
66. Although such removal does not eliminate the individual's right to contract dam-
ages, MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-413(c) (2) (1975) the absence
of adequate protection can result in a squeeze-out from all corporate control of
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provision designed to obviate such potential corporate conflict
could provide:
The President and Vice-Presidents of the Corporation
shall serve for a term of years, which may exceed one year,
as set forth in their agreements of employment with the
Corporation and until their respective successors are elected
and qualified.
Any action by the Board of Directors respecting the
removal of the President or the Vice-Presidents of the Cor-
poration shall be taken only by unanimous approval of
the entire Board of Directors.
If it is desirable that officer removal be more easily attainable,
the vote required for such removal could accordingly be adjusted
downward.
Carefully drafted provisions establishing the procedures by
which the board of directors is elected and board action is effectu-
ated will resolve major control problems in an entity in which
the members of the board and the stockholders are identical. If,
however, there are more stockholders than members of the board,
counsel should consider protection of those stockholders not on
the board by adding provisions requiring stockholder approval of
board actions not statutorily or traditionally subject to such ap-
proval, and varying the stockholder vote when it is statutorily
required.
The Code grants substantial latitude in drafting provisions that
accord stockholders a degree of involvement in what traditionally
have been considered director management decisions. 7 Imposition
of stockholder approval, for example, might be advisable when the
stockholders want the right to approve the election of officers, the
issuance of stock, or the repurchase of stock.68
one individual by others in a privately-held corporation. This potential is
particularly evident when only three or four stockholders control the corporation,
as those same individuals will also serve as corporate officers and sit on the
board of directors.
67. Recent court decisions in Maryland and other jurisdictions show a judicial readi-
ness to abandon the traditional prohibition against stockholder invasion of board
management powers. Under these decisions, such stockholders' protective pro-
visions will be upheld unless they totally preempt the board's management func-
tion. See, e.g., DeBoy v. Harris, 207 Md. 212, 113 A.2d 903 (1955), and Galler
v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E2d 577 (1964).
6& All of these are areas which are traditionally within the board of directors' con-
trol, but which nevertheless may be subjected to stockholder approval through
the "unless otherwise provided" language of the Code. See MD. ANN. CODE,
Corp. & Ass'ns Art, 2-413(a) (1975) (election of officers), id. § 2-204(b) (2)
(stock issuance), and id. § 2-310(a) (repurchase of stock).
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An example of such a provision follows:
The following provisions are hereby adopted for the purpose
of defining, limiting, and regulating the powers of the
Corporation and of the -diredtois and stockholders thereof:
With respect to:
(a) the issuance of shares of stock of any class now
or hereafter authorized, or any securities exchangeable for,
or convertible into such shares, or warrants or other in-
struments evidencing rights or options to subscribe for, or
otherwise acquire such shares;
(b) the redemption by the Corporation of shares of
its own stock or the purchase or other acquisition by the
Corporation of its own shares;
(c) the purchase by the Corporation other than in
the ordinary course of business, of property and assets at
a cost equivalent to or greater than fifty percent (50%)
of the net worth of the Corporation 'as reflected on the
balance sheet most recent to 'the date of such purchase;
(d) the amendment of any employment agreement,
or the alteration of the terms set forth therein, as shall
be entered into bdtween the Corporation and
(e) the making of any loans or advances by the
Corporation other than 'to enipl6yees 'and sUtliplieks in the
ordinary course 'of 'business;
and notwithstanding any provision of law authorizing any
action to be taken or authorized other'than as provided in
this Article, after due authorization and aiproval 'and
advice of such actions by the Board of Directors as 'equired
by law, any such action shall be effective Ad valid only 'if
approved by -the stockholders ;by an affirmative vote .of a
majority [or other designated number] :of the votesentitled
to be cast thereon.
The second type of protective provision varies the stockholder
vote statutorily required to approve such matters as charter amend-
ments, mergers, shake exchanges, consolidations, -transfers of as-
sets, partial liquidations and dissolutions. These matters are ef-
fectuated by the "affirmative vote of two-thirds of all 'the votes
entitled to 'be-cast"69 on 'the matter, absent a relevant 'charter pro-
vision. In practice, while control of 'the eledtion 'of the board of
directors -and its power to direct management is frequently -vested
69. See id. § 2-604 (chafter amendment), id. § 37105 (mergers, share exchanges,
consolidations, transfer of assets), id. .§ 3-301 (partial liquidation), and id.
§ 32403 (dissolution). A corpordtion may'be dissolved by the incorporators if




in stockholders actively involved in the operation of the business,
these "extraordinary" matters are frequently the subject 'of char-
ter provisions that accord significant vetoes to the minority and
passive stockholders by increasing the statutory vote otherwise
required to effectuate these decisions. For example, stockholders
who fear they may be "squeezed out" by one or more of the above
extraordinary corporate acts 70 can protect themselves by requir-
ing a high or unanimous stockholder vote for approval of such
actions.
On the other hand, there may be decisions for which the needs
of the individual enterpise dictate majority rather than two-
thirds stockholder appr6val without regard to minority interests.
For example, an individual who is the moving force in the organ-
ization of a corporation may wish to retain for him or herself
control over implementation of extraordinary corporate actions.
Such an individual 'may organize a corporation with dthers who
agree that he or she should have virtual control of the enterprise
but who, as the minority group, desire to retain forty-nine percent
of the equity. Such fifty-one percent stock ownership wbuld give
the majority stockholder control over the election of directors and
certain other stockholder matters. Yet, because of the statutory
two-thirds vote requirement, he or she could not control the vote
on extraordinary matters, discussed immediately above, unless the
charter specified that certain extraordinary cdrporate matters could
be implemented by approval of a majority of the shaies'entitled to
be cast thereon. This reduction of the statutory two-thirds vote
required for approval of charter amendments and ektrabrdinary
matters enhances management flexibility by making the vote re-
quired of stockholders more proporfionate to the percentage of
stock owned ,by management.
Other pr6visions which expand the management coritrol of a
particular stockholder's interest are Charter provisions giving the
board the right to adopt, alter or "repeal the'bylaws. This 'right is
otherwise statutorily vested in the stockholders. 71 Similarly, char-
ter provisions can eliminate the riglts of stoclholder dissent*and
of a fair appraisal 'r~medy, assertable with respect to a charter
amendment which substantially adversely affects the contract rights
of a stockholder.72 Such provisions can reduce the potential finan-
70. 'For a discussion of "squee~ze-outs" of niinority stockholders, see F. HODGE
O'W.A, OPPRLESSION OF MINjoaY S31A~koLDEiS (1975).
71. MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art.,'§ 2-19 9(b) (I975).
72. Id. § 3-202 (a) (3). The stockholders may be deprived of 'their fair appraisal
remedy only in connection with charter amendments, and not'in connection with
other extraordinary corporate acts.
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cial burden on a corporation that alters or abolishes any preferen-
tial right, any redemption right, or any preemptive rights accorded
outstanding stock, or that creates or alters restrictions on the
transferability of such stock, or excludes or limits the voting rights
of such stock.7 3 The following sample provision in the charter
would accomplish this result:
The Corporation reserves the right to amend its Charter
so that such amendment may alter the contract rights, as
expressly set forth in the Charter, of any outstanding stock,
and any objecting stockholder whose rights may or shall be
thereby substantially adversely affected shall not be en-
titled to the same rights as an objecting stockholder in the
case of a consolidation, merger, share exchange, or transfer
of substantially all of the assets of the Corporation.
Another expansion of management authority can be accom-
plished by a charter provision authorizing the board of directors
to classify or reclassify unissued shares of stock.74 Such a pro-
vision permits the board, without stockholder approval, to change
preferences, conversion or other rights, voting powers, restrict-
tions, limitations as to dividends, qualifications, or terms or con-
ditions of redemption of authorized but unissued stock. Otherwise,
each of these actions can be accomplished only by charter amend-
ment, which must be submitted for stockholder approval. 75
As the Code commentators have stated,76 before the codification
of preemptive rights in Maryland, there was uncertainty as to
when stockholder preemptive rights applied. The Code Revision
Commission attempted to resolve some of this uncertainty by
enumerating the circumstances in which a stockholder is not en-
titled to such rights.7 7 Nevertheless, uncertainty remains and im-
pairs the discretion of the board to issue stock at times and on
terms it deems to be in the best interests of the corporation. To
eliminate as much of this uncertainty as possible and to allow full
board discretion, a provision should be included in the charter
expressly negating preemptive rights unless the board specifically
implements them for a particular issuance of stock.78 The board
73. These matters are generally viewed as the type of "contract rights" that are the
subject of the dissenting stockholder's fair appraisal remedy.
74. MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-105(9) (1975).
75. See id., § 2-208, which sets forth the procedure followed when the board has
received the requisite authorization. Under this provision, articles supplementary
must be filed with the Department. Id.
76. See comment that follows id. § 2-205.
77. Id. See also id. § 2-205 for the circumstances under which preemptive rights
do not accrue.
78. See id. § 2-105(10), which authorizes such a provision.
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is thus relieved of the duty of analyzing whether preemptive rights
would otherwise apply to a given issuance, and yet is free to create
such rights if the interests of the corporation so dictate.
The array of charter provisions discussed in this section demon-
strates the scope of planning and drafting options available to
counsel in allocating control among the stockholders of a privately-
held corporation.
B. Allocation of Financial Interests
Although most early planning discussions and drafts will center
around basic decisions concerning the management and control of
the corporation, counsel may also need to draft charter provisions
affecting various financial interests within a group of potential
stockholders. Discussion of methods of capitalizing new enterprises
is beyond the scope of this article.79 Some basic matters, however,
deserve mention by way of introduction. Initial decisions as to the
desired debt-equity ratios ° and other preliminary tax matters"'
should be made by counsel working closely with accountants re-
tained by the incorporating group. Once it has been determined
how much of the initial capital of the corporation will be in the
form of equity, counsel has wide latitude in setting up the structure
of capital stock to reflect the needs and expectations of the organ-
izing stockholders. The most useful structuring approach is to
accord preferences and rights among various classes of stock. This
task is simplified by the checklist of possibilities set forth in the
Code itself.8 2
The classic example of the organization of a new privately-held
corporation involves three stockholders. One stockholder makes a
substantial investment of cash in the enterprise, another transfers
substantial assets to be utilized in the operation of the business,
and a third makes a nominal tangible contribution but is committed
to expending substantial time in the service of the corporation.8 3
79. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRLSTIEN, CORPORATE FINANCE (1975), for a more
comprehensive guide to financial considerations on incorporation.
80. See D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 135 (1966).
81. Some such preliminary tax matters include the election to be a Subchapter S
corporation (see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371), the decision to implement a
stock plan under § 1244 of the Internal Revenue Code (id. § 1244), and a
determination as to the advisability of seeking nonrecognition under § 351 of the
Internal Revenue Code in connection with certain transfers of property to a
corporation in exchange for its stock or securities, and if such determination is
made in the affirmative, then seeking to qualify such transfer within § 351 (id.
§ 351).
82. See MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-105(3), (4), (5) and (6) (1975).
83. For an example of such a privately-held corporation organizational pattern, see
D. HERWITZ, BuSINESS PLANNING prob. 1, at 1 (Supp. 1976).
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Frequently in such a situation, the parties making the substantial
cash and asset contributions will not be involved in the day-to-day
operation of the enterprise but, nevertheless, may desire to par-
ticipate in control and clearly seek a return in the investment which
they have in the enterprise. On the other hand, the contributor
of nominal tangible consideration may be content with his or her
salary and look only for long-term appreciation of his or her in-
terest in the business as well as some portion of control. Allocat-
ing control in the corporation through common stock on the one
hand, and guaranteeing a priority return on investment through
preferred stock or other senior securities on the other, can ac-
complish the objectives of the stockholders under these circum-
stances. Moreover, the utilization of common stock to be issued
for nominal consideration from each of the stockholders and pre-
ferred stock to be issued for the more significant contribution
of cash and assets by two of the stockholders should assist in
eliminating bargain compensation tax problems8 4 while allowing
qualification for a tax-free incorporation pursuant to Section 351
of the Internal Revenue Code. 5
In another practice setting, certain investors may desire the
right to redeem their stock prior to the holders of other classes
of stock. 6 This objective may be justified when the investor
simply wishes to encourage the initial growth of the enterprise
by supplying it with working capital in the form of equity, but
expects to recoup his investment when the enterprise is sufficiently
established to obtain capital from other sources.
Another occasion when preferences may be particularly import-
ant is upon liquidation.8 7 By according priorities to stockholders
who have invested capital, counsel can assure, to the extent of avail-
able assets, that their investment will be returned before liquidated
assets are allocated to other stockholders.
Finally, capital investors may seek preferences on declaration
of dividends, s and may require that counsel include provisions for
making such dividends cumulative. The following provision is sug-
gested as one alternative for meeting such requests:
(1) In the event of any voluntary or involuntary liquida-
tion (in whole or in part), dissolution, or winding-up of
84. See Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital in the Organi-
zation of a Close Corporation, 75 H~Av. L. REv. 1098 (1962).
85. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 351. For a discussion of problems respecting Section
351, see W. PAINTER, BusiNEss PLANNING 134-50 (1975).
86. Such preference is authorized by MD. ANN. CoDE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-105(5)(1975). The Code does, however, place certain restrictions on the redemption of
stock See id. § 2-311.
87. Such preference is authorized by id. § 2-105 (4).
88. Such preference is authorized by id. § 2-105(3) (i).
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the Corporation, the holders of the Common Stock and the
Preferred Stock of the Corporation shall be paid out of the
assets of the Corporation available for distribution to its
stockholders in the following order of priority:
(a) First, to the holders of the Preferred Stock an
amount equal to all unpaid accumulated dividends, if any,
thereon, without interest.
(b) Second, to the holders of the Preferred Stock an
amount equal to ....... ... Dollars (
per share and to the holders of the Common Stock an
amount equal to . ._.._Dollars ($....)
per share; provided, however, that in the event that the
assets of the Corporation available for distribution are in-
sufficient to make the distributions with respect to each
class of stock above set forth in this sub-paragraph (b),
then the aggregate amount distributed hereunder shall be
divided among the respective classes of stock in the follow-
ing proportions:
(i) - to the holders of the Preferred Stock.
(ii) ... to the holders of the Common Stock.
(c) Third, thereafter, the remaining assets of the
Corporation available for distribution to its stockholders
shall be distributed among and paid to the holders of Pre-
ferred Stock and Common Stock, share and share alike and
without any distinction as to class, in proportion to their
respective stockholdings.
A merger or consolidation of the Corporation with or
into any other corporation, a share exchange in which the
Corporation acquires all the issued or all the outstanding
shares of stock of one or more classes of another corpora-
tion by a stockholder vote and which does not affect the
corporate existence of the Corporation, or a sale, lease,
exchange, or transfer of all or any part of the assets of the
Corporation which shall not in fact result in the liquidation
(in whole or in part) of the Corporation and the distribu-
tion of its assets to its stockholders shall not be deemed
to be voluntary or involuntary liquidation (in whole or in
part), dissolution or winding-up of the Corporation.
(2) The holders of the Preferred Stock shall be entitled
to receive at the end of each and every fiscal year of the
Corporation, but only when and as authorized by the Board
of Directors of the Corporation, out of the assets of the
Corporation legally available for dividends, cash dividends
at the rate of _ Dollars ($---)
per share for each fiscal year of the Corporation, without
interest, before any sum or sums shall be set aside for or
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applied to the purchase or redemption of the Preferred
Stock or the purchase, redemption or other acquisition for
value of any other class of stock and before any dividend
shall be paid or declared, or any other distribution shall be
ordered or made, upon any other class of stock; provided,
however, that the declaration and payment of dividends
on the Preferred Stock shall be subject to and in accord-
ance with the following: If any dividends payable on the
Preferred Stock with respect to any fiscal year of the Cor-
poration are not paid for any reason, the right of the hold-
ers of the Preferred Stock to receive payment of such divi-
dend shall not lapse or terminate, but said unpaid dividend
or dividends shall accumulate and shall be paid without
interest to the holders of the Preferred Stock, when and
as authorized by the Board of Directors of the Corporation,
before any sum or sums shall be set aside for or applied
to the purchase or redemption of the Preferred Stock or the
purchase, redemption or other acquisition for value of any
other class of stock and before any dividend shall be paid
or declared, or any other distribution shall be ordered or
made, upon any other class of stock.
To reinforce a dividend preference, consideration should be
given to imposing sanctions on the non-payment of preferred divi-
dends. The most common device used by draftsmen of preferred
dividend provisions is a requirement that voting control shift from
holders of common stock to holders of preferred stock for periods
during which preferred dividends have not in fact been paid.
Completed articles of incorporation spell out the basic rights
respecting control and financial interest in the corporation, and
may thus be regarded as the constitution of the corporation. After
drafting the articles, counsel must undertake preparation of the
bylaws, which may be viewed practically as the legislation or in-
ternal administrative regulations governing corporate ministerial
matters.
IV. BYLAWS
The bylaws, in contrast to the articles, need not be filed with
the Department to be effective, but are instead adopted by the
board of directors at its organizational meeting,8 9 or by informal
organizational action through unanimous written consent.9 0 In
a privately-held corporation, it is important to review bylaw
89. Id. § 2-109 (a) (1). Subsequent bylaws must be adopted by the stockholders un-
less such power is reserved to the board by appropriate provision. Id. § 2-109(b).
90. See id. § 2-408(c), which authorizes informal board of director action and sets
forth the procedure required to implement such action.
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provisions and their implications with the organizing stockholders
before they are submitted to the board for adoption.
Most bylaw provisions relate to administrative matters rather
than to substantive matters affecting the operation of the enter-
prise.91 Thus the process of choosing bylaw provisions is often
simpler than the selection of appropriate charter provisions. For
example, an annual stockholders' meeting is statutorily required,9 2
and the bylaws need only specify the time when the meeting is to
be held, either by setting the date,93 or by naming a thirty-one day
period during which the board of directors may set the date.94
The annual meeting should generally be held approximately ninety
days after the date beginning the fiscal year, which should be set
after discussion with the corporation's accountant of possible tax
consequences. Spelling out the fiscal year in the bylaws and allowing
ninety days before the specified annual meeting date affords cor-
porate management the opportunity to prepare fiscal year financial
statements for review prior to the annual meeting.
Other bylaw provisions that contain statutory guidelines, and
thus require minimum client input prior to drafting, should never-
theless be included to promote smooth corporate functioning.9 5
Those matters include the procedure for calling special stock-
holder meetings, 96 the notice required for annual and special meet-
ings,97 and the place where such meetings are to be held.98 Other
similar provisions include a recitation of the board of directors'
power to direct the management of the corporation,99 authorization
91. There are no mandatory bylaw provisions. Nevertheless, the Code's lack of
statutory guidelines on certain matters necessitates inclusion of provisions
governing these matters if corporate needs so dictate. For example, if cor-
porate directors are to have certain qualifications, they must be specified in the
charter or bylaws, as the Code is silent on the subject. While the bylaws may
contain any provision "not inconsistent with law or the charter of the corpora-
tion for the regulation and management of the affairs of the corporation," id. §
2-110, it is generally advisable to follow the statutory pattern and include vir-
tually all provisions relating to capital stock and essential management func-
tions in the charter, thus limiting the bylaws to administrative matters.
92. Id. § 2-501(a). Failure to hold an annual meeting does not, however, invalidate
otherwise legal corporate actions. Id. § 2-501(d).
93. Id. §2-501 (b) (1).
94. Id. § 2-501(b) (2). Specification of a thirty-one day period accords greater
potential for finding a time which is convenient to all stockholders of a privately-
held enterprise.
95. Well-drafted corporate charters and bylaws can prove to be invaluable tools for
guiding corporate management through its legal obligations, as those individuals
charged with management duties may well be unaware of the administrative steps
which they must undertake if their actions are to be legally valid.
96. MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-502 (1975).
97. Id. § 2-504.
98. Id. § 2-503.
99. Id. § 2-401.
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for designation of board committees, 100 and banking authoriza-
tion.101 Administrative matters relating to capital stock include
procedures for initial issuance of stock certificates, 10 2 issuance of
new certificates evidencing transfer of shares, 0 3 determination of
registered holders, 04 and record date criteria, or in lieu thereof,
standards for closing stock transfer books. 05
In those areas, however, where bylaws could vary statutory
provisions relating to corporate control, they merit far more cau-
tious and considered draftsmanship than provisions covering the
matters discussed immediately above. One such area is the scope
of authority granted to officers in the bylaws. 06 A specific director-
officer could be given express authority to direct a particular phase
of the business. Such a grant of power, coupled with provisions
requiring unanimous board action to alter that authority10 7 or to
remove the officer' 0 could ensure that officer's continued unfettered
control of the designated business operation. To illustrate, a vice
president who is also one of three stockholders and directors of the
corporation could negotiate the right to make all final product
design decisions. A series of bylaw provisions insulating the officer
from removal, and permitting alterations of such limitations only
with the concurrence of all directors (including the officer-director
in question) could accomplish the desired result.
The designation of the power to amend the bylaws may also
significantly affect the allocation of control within the corporation.
If a corporation is to have many more stockholders than directors,
stockholder and board objectives may diverge in regard to certain
matters. If the prospective stockholders decide to favor board
interests in general, they can tip the scales of corporate control
heavily in the board's favor by granting the board rather than the
100. Id. § 2-411. Although the board may delegate its authority, such delegation does
not relieve the board or its members of any legal responsibilities. Id. § 2-411 (c).
101. It may be preferable to authorize banking transactions through bank forms
adopted in the corporate minutes rather than through bylaw provision.
102. MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-210 (1975). See also id., § 2-211,
which specifies the form required for stock certificates.
103. Id. § 2-210(a).
104. See id. § 2-209 on contents and keeping of stock ledger.
105. Id. § 2-511.
106. See id. § 2-414, which provides that the scope of the officers' powers shall be
delineated in the bylaws. It is generally advisable to take advantage of the statu-
tory option to designate officers, such as a Chairman of the Board and Assistant
Secretary and Assistant Treasurer, in addition to those mandated by the Code.
Id. § 2-412(b). Designation of such additional officers facilitates attestation and
execution of corporate documents. See id. § 1-301.




stockholders the right to amend the bylaws.109 Such power would
permit the board to alter notice and quorum requirements to dilute
stockholder power. If the directors are given authority to amend
the bylaws by increasing the size of the board, 10 and such power
is unchecked by altering the directors' statutory right to fill board
vacancies,"' a majority of the board will be in a position to dilute
the effectiveness of assertions of minority interests. In such cir-
cumstances the following provisions might be used to protect
minority interests:
In the event that the number of directors is increased
as provided in these bylaws, the additional directors so pro-
vided for shall be elected by a majority of the shares en-
titled to vote for such directors at a special meeting of the
stockholders to be called by the President with respect
thereto, and shall hold office until the next annual meeting
of stockholders and thereafter until his or their successors
shall be elected.
The stockholders, and only the stockholders, shall have
the power and authority to amend, alter or repeal these
bylaws or any provision thereof, and may from time to
time make additional bylaws.
Traditionally, more significant matters respecting control and
voting rights within the corporation are covered by the charter
as discussed above." 2 Nevertheless, the bylaws have traditionally
been utilized to state quorum requirements for board of directors
and stockholder meetings. Such quorum requirements should be
drafted to complement provisions respecting voting that have been
included in the charter. Board of directors' meeting quorum re-
quirements highlight a crucial control implication of the bylaws.
One example of the implication of quorum requirements is dis-
cussed above.113 Another example could involve a corporation with
a four-person board of directors (who presumably are the only
stockholders of the corporation). Absent a special quorum re-
quirement and voting requirements in the charter, action could
be taken by such board upon the votes of only two directors." 4 To
avoid such a possibility, the quorum requirement should be tied
109. See MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-109(b) (1975), which vests the
power to alter the bylaws in the stockholders, subject to charter or bylaw
variation.
110. See id.
111. Id. § 2-407.
112. See text accompanying notes 41-78 supra.
113. See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
114. See note 60 supra.
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to attendance of the entire board of directors." 5 Such a provision
practically eliminates the possibility of director action by less than
a majority of the board, and assures all directors in a privately-
held corporation a voice in board decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
This article does not discuss other incorporation matters such
as the organizational meeting of the board of directors,"" stock
issuance, 17 and buy-sell agreements." 8 Nevertheless, it provides a
review of control and financial considerations affecting the drafting
of articles of incorporation and bylaws, and demonstrates the
breadth of information that must be communicated by counsel to
a group of clients in connection with the incorporation of their
enterprise. Upon having such information communicated to them,
clients should comprehend that the organization of a corporation is
much more than the process of preparing and filing standard
documents, but rather involves accommodating their divergent in-
terests through a wide range of planning possibilities accorded
them by the Code. Any general practitioner advising a group of
prospective stockholders planning a privately-held corporation
must not merely rely on a given set of forms. Rather, he or she
must be fully cognizant of all requirements and options set forth
in the Code.
115. Clients should be advised that such a quorum requirement could make it difficult
to conduct board meetings, since the absence of any board member precludes a
quorum. At the same time, however, a director who purposely absents him or
herself from a meeting to prevent a quorum may be estopped from objecting to
the meeting being conducted without him or her. See Gearing v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d
201, 182 N.E.2d 391, 227 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1962).
116. MD. ANN. CODE, Corp. & Ass'ns Art., § 2-109 (1975).
117. See id. §§ 2-201 to 2-216.
118. See SHAPIRO & SACHS, supra note 5, ch. 3 (1976), and Ghinger, Shareholders'
Agreements for Closely Held Corporations: Special Tools for Special Circutn-
stances, 4 U. BALT. L. Rxv. 211 (1975).
